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Abstract:   Mark Weisbrot (2008) has claimed that under the Chávez 
administration in Venezuela the share of pro-poor spending has increased, inequality 
has declined, poverty has fallen rapidly, and there has been a massive reduction in 
illiteracy.  All of these conclusions are based on the use of heavily slanted data and on 
the misinterpretation of the existing empirical evidence. Weisbrot uses estimates of 
social spending that are upward biased by the inclusion of large infrastructure 
projects, debt refinancing, and even military spending; his inequality data is distorted 
by the inexplicable exclusion of households that received no income; his econometric 
estimates on illiteracy actually show the exact opposite of what he is arguing for.  
Weisbrot confuses basic economic concepts and offers a bizarre interpretation of 
events leading up to the 2002 currency crisis. Once one corrects for Weibrot’s biases, 
the evidence paints a consistent image of an administration that has not effectively 
prioritized the well-being of the Venezuelan poor. 
                                                 
1 Assistant Professor of Economics and Latin American Studies, Wesleyan University, 238 Church Street, 





In a paper published in the March/April issue of Foreign Affairs  (Rodríguez, 2008), I 
argued that there is little evidence that the government of Hugo Chávez has given priority 
to the well-being of Venezuela’s poor.  In recent days Mark Weisbrot (2008) published a 
rebuttal on the website of the Center for Economic Policy Research - a Washington think-
tank that he co-directs -  arguing that some of my conclusions were “altogether wrong, 
and others grossly exaggerated and/or misleading.”  In particular, Weisbrot argued that I 
am mistaken in asserting that the share of pro-poor spending has not increased under 
Chávez, that inequality had risen, that the government had not taught 1.5 million persons 
how to read and write, that the rate of poverty reduction has been slower than normal 
given Venezuela’s economic growth, that other health and human development indicators 
show a deterioration in the living standards of the poor, and that the 2002 recession was 
not caused by the country’s political crisis.  On each of these, Weisbrot argues the exact 
for the exact opposite conclusions to those that I have drawn. 
I welcome the opportunity to have an in-depth discussion of the evidence regarding 
the well-being of the Venezuelan poor under Chávez.  Indeed, many of the points raised 
in Weisbrot’s paper as well as in this response have been discussed previously in 
academic fora.  The broad dissemination of both papers thus offers an extraordinary 
opportunity to involve a broader group of policymakers and academics in the discussion 
and analysis of Venezuela’s social and economic policies. 
As I will show, Weisbrot’s critiques are generally invalid, relying on erroneous 
reading of the evidence or use of severely biased indicators that do not accurately reflect 
the evolution of the Venezuelan economy or the well-being of the poor.  For example, I 
will show that Weisbrot’s estimates of social spending are upward biased by the inclusion 
of large infrastructure projects, debt refinancing, and even military spending in what he 
contends is pro-poor spending, that his inequality data is distorted by the inexplicable 
exclusion of households that received no income, and that his econometric estimates on 
the effect of the Robinson program on illiteracy actually show the exact opposite of what 
he is arguing for. Weisbrot’s other criticisms are based on a misinterpretation of the 
concept of elasticity and on the questionable interpretation of existing health indicators 
and of the evidence leading to the 2002 recession. 
  Before delving into these differences, I would like to emphasize one basic point of 
agreement with Weisbrot.  Official Venezuelan statistics are far from the ideal of what 
we would need in order to properly evaluate the performance of the Chávez 
administration.  Well-designed impact assessments of the government’s social programs 
are either inexistent or have not been made public by the administration.  The raw data 
and methodological descriptions necessary to replicate official calculations are only made 
available with severe lags, and often not at all. Many series that are vital to the analysis of 
the government’s policies are not public, and it is not uncommon for different entities to 
produce contradictory numbers.  These weaknesses cause an inherent ambiguity in the 
interpretation of the evidence regarding the Chávez administration, a fact that helps to 
underline the usefulness of a serious academic debate on how to read the data.   3
  In the rest of this note, I will take each one of Weisbrot’s criticisms and show why 
they are invalid.  In most cases, I will show that he has misinterpreted the evidence or 
used severely biased indicators, and that when we correct for these biases we come to 
conclusions which are opposite to what he contends. In a number of issues, our 
disagreements reflect alternative possible interpretations of ambiguous data, and it is 
useful to lay out the sources of these differences in interpretation for readers to make up 
their own minds.  All in all, I will argue, the image that emerges from a close reading of 
the evidence is still one in which there is little evidence that the Chávez administration 
has prioritized or produced favorable effects on the well-being of the poor above and 
beyond what we could have expected any other government to do. 
 
1.  Has the share of pro-poor spending gone up? 
 
In my article, I argued that government spending figures show no evidence that the 
Chávez administration is giving greater priority to the categories of spending that benefit 
the poor.  As an example, I cited the fact that the average share of the central 
government’s budget allocated to health, education, and housing during Chávez’s first 
years in office was 25.12 percent, essentially identical to the share in the previous eight-
year period, 25.08 percent.  Weisbrot has countered with three pieces of evidence: that 
the share of social spending – a broader category - in total spending has increased 
markedly since 1998, that the absolute amount of resources received by the poor has also 
increased significantly, and that my calculations exclude the contributions by PDVSA to 
social projects, which he claims summed to $13.3 billion, or 7.3 percent of GDP, in 2006. 
Before looking at the data in detail, it is relevant to think a bit about what we should 
be looking for.  Let us start from the following fact: the Venezuelan state is undeniably 
much richer today than it was nine years ago, to a great extent (if not completely) due to 
the ten-fold increase in oil prices that has occurred since 1999. As a result, the 
Venezuelan government has substantially increased its spending levels, and therefore is 
indeed spending more in real terms on just about any type of expenditures. This means 
that all categories of spending can be expected to have increased in real terms since 
Chávez reached office, be they social programs, infrastructure projects, military 
spending, or growth of the public bureaucracy.   
But the absolute level of pro-poor spending is not what should concern us if we are 
interested in evaluating a government’s priorities. Precisely because the government has 
experienced such a huge windfall, we want to study how it has allocated it among 
different possible objectives. To use an intuitive metaphor, if you want to know how 
much your rich uncle cared about you, you’d like to compare how much of his 
inheritance he left you with what he gave everyone else.  If all of your siblings got a 
million dollars in his will, while you received the old man’s poodle to take care of, it 
would be hard to argue that you were his favorite nephew.  Thus, of all the pieces of 
evidence thrown about by Weisbrot, the ones that we should study closely are those that 
reflect the relative distribution of government spending among different categories of 
spending. 
What do we see when we look at these figures? The upper panel of Table 1 shows the 
percentage share of different categories of “social” spending in total government   4
spending.
2 I compare two periods of equal length: 1999-2006, corresponding to the 
Chávez administration, and 1991-1998, corresponding to the previous eight years, in 
order not to contaminate the comparison by the behavior of the data in one particular 
year. I enclose the word “social” in quotation marks precisely because, as should become 
clear by looking at the categories included in it, only some of these types of expenditure 
are pro-poor.  Financing of the education and health system, as well as public housing 
programs are clearly programs that are primarily oriented towards the poor.  This is also 
arguably the case with social development expenditures, but definitely not the case with 
investment in science and technology or culture and communications. 
In any case, what strikes one as evident when one looks at Table 1 is that the only 
significant change in government priorities that appears to have occurred in this period is 
an increase in social security spending.  Indeed, if one takes out social security, the share 
of social spending in total spending actually goes down from 32.0 to 29.8% between the 
pre-Chávez and pro-Chávez periods.  Therefore, the increase in the share of “social” 
spending that Weisbrot presents as evidence of the government’s pro-poor priorities is 






Education, Health and Housing 25.1% 25.1%
Social Development 5.6% 3.3%
Culture and Communications 0.8% 0.7%
Science and Technology 0.5% 0.7%
Social Security 4.5% 9.9%
All Categories 36.5% 39.7%




Venezuelan social security spending is essentially spending on pensions.  Roughly 
half of the budgetary assignment to the social security system goes to the financing of the 
Venezuelan Social Security Institute (Instituto Venezolano de los Seguros Sociales) while 
the other half goes to direct payment of public sector pensions, including the very 
generous military pension system, which by itself accounts for 8.9% of total government 
social security spending.
3  There is a vast array of evidence showing that pension 
expenditures in Latin America are highly regressive because poor individuals tend to 
belong to the informal sector, and thus do not enjoy coverage by the formal social 
security system.
4  This is certainly the case in Venezuela, where only 13% of individuals 
in the lowest quintile participate in the social security system.
5 
                                                 
2 These calculations use the Escuela de Gerencia Social’s spending indicators, available 
(http://www.gerenciasocial.org.ve/bases_datos/gerenciasocial/cuadros/Gasto/PresupuestoSocial.zip. 
3 See Ministerio del Poder Popular para las Finanzas (2007), p. 184. 
4 See, e.g., World Bank (2004). 
5 Own calculations from  the Households Surveys available at 
http://frrodriguez.web.wesleyan.edu/space/FP_debate.zip.   5
In sum, the share of the central government budget devoted to pro-poor spending has 
not increased.  The only category of “social” spending that has increased markedly is 
spending on pensions, which are regressive.  In a particularly befuddling instance of 
trickle-down thought, Weisbrot actually argues that even if the beneficiaries of the 
pension system are relatively better-off formal sector workers “their pensions are in many 
cases shared with families and extended families who are in the informal sector, thus 
contributing to poverty reduction among others besides the recipients.” Using this 
reasoning, Weisbrot could just as well go ahead and throw in the rest of the budget into 
social expenditures. 
Alas, this is not that far from what he goes on to do.  Weisbrot goes on to criticize me 
for excluding PDVSA “social” expenditures, which according to him sum to $13.3 
billion, or 7.3% of GDP, in pro-poor spending.  The simple reason why one need not 
include them is that including them makes little difference to the aggregate calculations, 
as most of these expenditures are not, under any conceivable definition of the category, 
classifiable as social or pro-poor expenditures.   
Table 2 presents the decomposition of what PDVSA calls “expenditures for social 
development,” calculated using PDVSA’s financial statements, both for 2006 and for the 
whole 2001-06 period.
6  We have classified PDVSA expenditures according to one of 
three categories, corresponding to the categories of spending that we have used for the 
central government budget: education, health and housing; other social spending; and 
non-social spending.  In 2006, only 26.8 % of PDVSA’s “expenditures for social 
development” corresponded to spending on educational, health, or housing programs 
(including the educational and health misiones and low-income housing projects) while 
an additional 10.5 corresponded to other social expenditures (Mercal, Misión Ciencia, 
Community Development).  Thus the total share of social spending was 37.4% of total 
PDVSA expenditures.  Note that these percentages (26.8% and 37.4%) are very similar to 
those found for the central government budget and shown in Table 1 (25.1% and 39.7%). 
Adjusting government expenditures for PDVSA’s expenditures thus leaves essentially 
unchanged the conclusion that the priorities of the current Venezuelan administration – at 
least as far as its spending figures reveal – are very similar to those of its predecessors.  
 
                                                 
6 PDVSA(2006). “Expenditures for Social Development” actually sum to $12.0 billion. Once one includes 
subsidiaries, the figure goes up to $13.7 billion. We use the more detailed accounts for PDVSA 
expenditures as these are available since 2001; the differences once one includes subsidiaries are minor and 
do not alter our main point.See the Appendix for the full decomposition and classification of PDVSA 
expenditures.   6
Education, 
Health and 





Direct Expenditures 2130 1265 3396 676 4072
Investment Funds 207 0 207 859 1066
FONDEN 882 0 882 5974 6856
Total 3219 1265 4484 7510 11994
Percent 26.8% 10.5% 37.4% 62.6% 100%
Years 2001-2006
Direct Expenditures 4957 2081 7037 1110 8147
Investment Funds 857 0 857 6709 7566
FONDEN 1078 0 1078 7303 8381
Total 6892 2081 8972 15122 24094
28.6% 8.6% 37.2% 62.8% 100%
Source: See Appendix
Table 2: Decomposition of PDVSA's "Expenditures for Social Development"
 
 
What, then, makes up the bulk of PDVSA’s “social” expenditures? Table 3 lists the 
eight largest non-social items included in PDVSA’s “social” expenditures.  These include 
$3.2 billion for debt refinancing, $1.1 billion for Ministry of Defense projects, $1.3 
billion for four large infrastructure projects, and $613 million for capitalization of two 
sectoral finance entities.  These projects are representative of the broader pattern of 
PDVSA’s non-oil business related expenses. Whatever the relative merit of these 
investments, it is very hard to categorize them as expenditures whose primary aim is to 








Ministry of Finance - Debt Restructuring 3221 FONDEN
Ministry of Defense - Various Projects 1093 FONDEN
Highway - Ezequiel Zamora 476 FONDEN
Agricultural, Fishing and Forestry Fund 327 FONDEN
Venezuelan Argicultural Bank 286 FONDEN
Orinoco River Bridge 273 FONDEN
Caracas-Tuy Railroad 272 FONDESPA
Barquisimeto Mass Transit System 251 FONDESPA
Source: PDVSA (2006), pp.71-76
Table 3: Largest Non-Social Expenditures included in PDVSA's 
"Expenditures for Social Development"
 
 
In sum, regardless of whether one includes or excludes PDVSA expenditures in the 
aggregate budget figures, there is little evidence of a change in the priority given to pro-
poor spending in the Venezuelan budget. The relative shares of pro-poor spending appear 
to be very similar to those of previous periods, although of course the absolute levels are 
higher. The only way to reach a different conclusion is to include either spending in 
pensions or large infrastructure projects, debt refinancing, and military spending in the 
definition of pro-poor spending.  This is clearly not reasonable.   7
 
2.  Has inequality increased or decreased? 
 
In my article, I argued that Venezuelan income inequality had gone up since Chávez 
came into office, and in particular since the second semester of 2000, the moment in 
which Chávez gained control of all branches of government and was first granted 
enabling law legislation allowing him to approve laws by Executive Decree.   In 
particular, I cited the findings of a study by the Venezuelan Central Bank that found this 
deterioration in the 2000-2005 period.
7  Weisbrot takes issue with the comparability of 
the indicators used by the Central Bank.  In response, he cites a series of income 
inequality calculated by the National Institute of Statistics that shows a strong 
improvement in inequality starting in 2006 which offsets the increase occurring up to 
2005. 
The series cited by Weisbrot is highly problematic because it excludes from the 
calculation all households with reported income equals to zero, thus omitting the poorest 
households from the construction of an inequality index.  This fact is illustrated in Figure 
1, where I show the effect of excluding zero-income households from the calculation of 
income inequality.
8  If they are excluded, the Gini index declines from .461 in the first 
semester of 1999 to .448 in the first semester of 2006, a decline of .012 points.  When all 
households are counted, however, the relative comparison changes, and the index 
increases from .475 to .488 for the same period.  Thus it appears that the decline in 
inequality in the series cited by Weisbrot up to 2006 is an artifact created by the 
exclusion of the poorest households from the sample. Figure 2 shows that the 
deterioration of inequality is also present for a variety of alternative inequality indicators 




                                                 
7 This trend is actually present for many different income inequality measures for the 2000-05 period, a fact 
that Weisbrot misses in part because he only reports first semester figures.  Alternative series differ in the 
magnitude of this increase and in whether the improvement after 2006 is large enough to offset it. 
8 All of these calculations are done using the raw data from the Venezuelan Households Surveys, available 
at http://frrodriguez.web.wesleyan.edu/data.htm.    8
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The National Institute of Statistics has not yet released its raw data for the second 
semester of 2006 or the first semester of 2007; in the last of these periods it estimated a   9
further decline in inequality. Note, however, that there are periods during which the Gini 
excluding zero-income households and that including all households move in different 
directions, so that it is not a foregone conclusion that the properly calculated series will 
also decline.
9  More importantly, inspection of Figures 1 and 2 appear to reveal three 
distinct periods: a period of decline in inequality that starts in 1998 (the last year of the 
Caldera administration) and continues up to 2000, a sharp increase in inequality that 
occurs in 2001 (before the political crisis start), and a stabilization at high levels of 
inequality after 2002, with large roughly offsetting up and down swings in the final three 
periods. Whether this will be followed by a reversion to the levels characteristic of the 
start of the decade remains to be seen, but what is true is that, at least until very recently, 
inequality climbed and remained high during the Chávez administration. 
 
3.  Did the Chávez government teach 1.5 million persons how to read and write? 
 
Weisbrot takes issue with the claim, made in my Foreign Affairs article as well as in a 
more extensive and technical research paper jointly written with Daniel Ortega (Ortega 
and Rodríguez, 2008a), that the data does not support the hypothesis that the Venezuelan 
government enrolled 1.5 million persons in the Misión Robinson literacy program. He 
claims that the simplicity of the Households Survey question – which asks the respondent 
whether each family member knows how to read and write - makes it impossible to use it 
to assess the effects of a literacy program. Furthermore, he also claims to have found, 
together with his coauthor David Rosnick - also of the Center for Economic Policy 
Research – that our results were not robust and an artifact of the specification that we 
chose. 
We have already provided an extensive rebuttal of Weisbrot and Rosnick’s objections 
to our paper (Ortega and Rodríguez, 2008b).  As we show there, Weisbrot and Rosnick’s 
arguments provide no support for the hypothesis that Venezuela carried out a large scale 
literacy program – indeed, their estimates show the exact opposite.  It is only by 
systematically ignoring the results of his own empirical analysis that Weisbrot is able to 
keep on claiming that the Venezuelan government taught upwards of one million persons 
how to read and write. 
Let us consider for a moment the leap of faith one must take to believe that the 
Venezuelan government carried out a large scale literacy program but that nevertheless 
that program fails to register in our data. Imagine that the Venezuelan government did 
indeed give reading and writing classes to 1.5 million Venezuelans.  Surely, if these 
people already felt that they could read and write before the program, then they would 
have answered “yes” to the literacy question both before and after the end of the program, 
and thus would not be picked up by the survey.  But the fact is that there were 1.1 million 
people who were claiming not to know how to read and write in early 2003.  So in order 
to believe that the program took place one would either have to believe that (i) the 
                                                 
9 An additional problem in evaluating income inequality figures in the first semester of 2007 would come 
from the fact that during this period there were growing scarcities for consumption items of the poor, a fact 
that we discuss in more detail in the next section.  Given that scarcity increases the income level necessary 
to achieve certain levels of consumption, it is also likely that even a decline in inequality of nominal 
incomes would not represent a decline in inequality of real incomes.   10
program did not reach these people, or (ii) these people still claimed not to know how to 
read and write even after finishing the program. 
  The first possibility (a massive program not reaching a substantial fraction of 
those who claimed to be illiterate) is hard to believe and in itself would be an indictment 
of the program’s effectiveness.  We would have to buy the story that the Venezuelan 
government devoted the massive resources necessary to put upwards of a million persons 
in classrooms and yet ended up putting exactly the wrong million persons in the program 
- those who already felt that they knew how to read and write – while systematically 
excluding those who claimed to need the program the most.  In order to get an idea of the 
dimension of the necessary assumptions, imagine that the program was composed in 90% 
of people who claimed to know how to read and write, with only the other 10% coming 
from the group that believed to be illiterate.  Even in that case, taking the government’s 
claims at face value, 150 thousand people who claimed to be illiterate before the start of 
the program would have enrolled in it.  But this number is more than three times as high 
as the largest point estimates found in our study (as well as in Weisbrot and Rosnick’s 
analysis). 
  The second possibility is almost as farfetched.  It would imply that upwards of a 
million persons who claimed not to know how to read and write were enrolled in a seven-
week program, showed their skills by composing a letter to President Chávez at the end 
of the program, received a certificate that indicated that they had passed the Robinson 
program, yet would still assert that they did not know how to read and write when asked 
by an interviewer.  It would appear that in order for this to be true the program 
participants would have to be extremely skeptical that anything that they did while in the 
program even remotely resembled a literacy course.  Again, if this were true, it would in 
itself constitute a striking demonstration of the program’s failure. 
  How about Weisbrot’s claim that our results were not robust and an artifact of our 
choice of specification? As we show in our detailed rebuttal, what Weisbrot and Rosnick 
found was that there was one of the dozens of specifications that we evaluated – an 
aggregate time-series regression with a lagged program indicator – in which you could 
find a program effect. This is of course a common phenomenon – whenever you run 
hundreds of specifications, some of them will be significant. Weisbrot and Rosnick have 
selected the one specification that gives the results which are most favorable to the 
Venezuelan government.  But indeed, even Rosnick and Wesibrot’s preferred 
specification imply that only between 34 and 42 thousands persons benefited from the 
program. This is quite far from 1.5 million persons. In other words, Rosnick and 
Weisbrot’s results show that the Venezuelan government did not carry out a massive 
literacy program – indeed, their estimates point to a program of approximate size less 
than 1/30
th of that claimed by the Venezuelan government. Remarkably, this is a result 
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In my article, I argued that the performance of the Chávez administration in reducing 
poverty compared unfavorably with that of most other countries.  As an illustrative 
calculation, I showed that the decline in poverty between the first semester of 2003 and 
the first semester of 2007 corresponded to a decline of roughly one percent in the poverty 
rate for every percentage point increase in per capita income, a ratio that compares 
unfavorably to that of most cross-national estimates, which put the elasticity at around 
minus two.
10  Weisbrot argued that if this was true, Venezuela should have eliminated 
poverty during this period, a conclusion which appears absurd. 
It is a basic mathematical fact that with a finite elasticity of poverty reduction, 
poverty will never reach zero for any positive level of income, a truth that seems to 
escape Weisbrot.  I realize that I may have inadvertently contributed to Weisbrot’s 
confusion in this case by using an approximation to the income elasticity of poverty 
reduction which was reflective of the patterns found in more detailed calculations which I 
did not discuss for reasons of technical complexity.  The source of confusion in this case 
is that the percent change definition that I used is an approximation to the point elasticity 
(the relative change in the dependent variable for an infinitesimally small relative change 
in the independent variable), which will only be accurate if the poverty-income 
relationship is linear. 
A more precise estimate of the income elasticity of poverty reduction will require at 
least two adjustments.  One of them is the use of a functional form that allows us to 
estimate the point elasticity adequately.  The other is to properly account for the effect of 
scarcities of consumption items in the poverty basket in the first semester of 2007. These 
adjustments operate in opposite directions, and for some reasonable parameter values 
their effects cancel out.  However, even if one accepts only one of these adjustments, 
Venezuela’s elasticity of poverty reduction appears to be at best near the lower bound of 
– and at worst substantially lower than – cross-national estimates. 
The first adjustment reflects the need to properly take into account the nonlinearity of 
the poverty-income relationship.  Properly estimating the point elasticity requires the 
assumption of a functional form that allows us to traduce the observations of discrete 
changes in poverty (what we observe) into point estimates corresponding to 
infinitesimally small changes.  The simplest and most common way to do this is by 
assuming an isoelastic logarithmic specification, such as: 
it i it y pov log log β α + =         ( 1 )  
Note that using the log elasticity definition will raise the income elasticity of poverty 
reduction, a reflection of the fact that for an isoelastic function like (1) the elasticity will 
always be underestimated by the percentage change definition.  If one uses definition (1) 
for Venezuela for the period between the first semester of 2003 and the first semester of 
2007, one gets an elasticity estimate of -1.67 ln(27.5/54)/ln(942,308/629,589). This 
                                                 
10 By contrast, Ravaillon and Chen (1997) estimate the log-elasticity of poverty reduction at between -2.59 
and -3.12 on a sample of 64 developing countries.  World Bank (2000) estimates -2, a value that is similar 
to that estimated by Bourgoignon (2003) and routinely used in World Bank simulations.   12
estimate is still lower in absolute value than – though closer to the lower bound of - the 
values found in most of the cross-national literature. 
A second adjustment necessary to accurately estimate the elasticity of poverty 
reduction in Venezuela is to take into account the effect of the chronic scarcities of basic 
foodstuffs subject to price controls that occurred in Venezuela since early 2007. 
According to the Venezuelan Central Bank, the scarcity index (percentage of times for 
which surveyors were not able to find the item in question) was 14.3% in the first quarter 
of 2007, with extremely high levels for basic staples of poor families’ diet like sardines 
(86%), black beans (85%), and milk (65%).  Since the regulated prices of these goods are 
used to construct the poverty line, this line will cease to be an adequate indicator of the 
resources necessary to escape poverty when scarcity is prevalent as it will be measuring 
the price of a basket of goods that poor individuals cannot buy.  As individuals either buy 
these goods in black markets which are not covered in the price index surveys, or 
substitute towards more expensive sources of caloric intake, the real income necessary to 
attain a standard of living above poverty will increase. 
Quantifying the effect of scarcities on the poverty line is an extremely difficult task, 
because it would require information on the prices that individuals pay on the black 
market as well as the substitutability between different sources of calories.  As we lack 
that information, we can try to put some reasonable bounds on its magnitude, which will 
ultimately depend on the prevalence of scarcity in the consumption basket of the poor and 
the magnitude of the black market/substitution premium.  Given that scarcities are 
concentrated in the goods that are under price controls, and that the strictest controls 
affect precisely the prices of the consumption baskets of the poor, it is intuitive to assume 
that the scarcity level affecting the poor is larger than that of the population as a whole.  
Let us suppose that it is between 2 and 3 times as large.  On the other hand, let us assume 
that the markup on the prices of goods in the black market is between 20 and 40%.  In 
that case we can create a lower bound scenario in which accounting for scarcity would 
raise the poverty line by 5.72% (2*.143*.2) and an upper bound scenario where it would 
raise it by 17.16% (3*.143*.4) in comparison to the poverty line used by the National 
Institute of Statistics. 
How many additional people would this place under the poverty line? Since the 
National Institute has not yet made publicly available the raw survey data for the first 
semester of 2007, we use the latest available survey (first semester of 2006) to make this 
calculation. In order to do this, we find a cutoff level of income in this distribution such 
that the number of people below it will be similar to those in poverty according to official 
statistics in the first semester of 2006.  
11  We then raise the poverty line by our upper and 
lower bound estimates and calculate the new number of households in poverty.  The 
resulting estimates of the number of households under poverty in the lower and upper 
bound scenarios are respectively 29.3% and 35.8%. We call these the scarcity-adjusted 
poverty rates.  Using the scarcity-adjusted poverty rates, the log-elasticity of poverty 
reduction decreases to -1.51 in the lower bound scenario and -1.02 in the upper bound 
scenario, numbers that are substantially smaller than cross-national estimates and close to 
the number presented in my article. 
                                                 
11 That number is 27.2% of the population. Since there is a discrete mass of individuals at this income level, 
it is not possible to find a level that will exactly replicate the rate of 27.5% corresponding to the first 
semester of 2007.   13
Relying on this same methodology, we can back out what the poverty rate should 
have been in Venezuela in the first semester of 2007 if the country had has an income 
elasticity of poverty reduction equal to -2, closer to the average of other countries.  In that 
case, we can derive that the scarcity-adjusted poverty rate should have fallen to 24 points.  
Remember, however, that since the rate of poverty that is reported by the National 
Institute is not scarcity-adjusted, we would have to use our upper and lower bound effects 
again to calculate the poverty rate that we would have observed in this scenario. Once we 
do that, we derive a range of values between 18.5% and 22.5%.  This is the range to 
which the poverty rate should have fallen if the Venezuelan economy had evolved 
according to the patterns observed in .other developing economies. 
 
5.  Other objections 
 
Among the other elements of my analysis that Weisbrot has objected to are the use of 
indicators of low birthweight babies, quality of dwellings, and drinking water access to 
evaluate the well-being of the Venezuelan poor, as well as my interpretation of the events 
preceding the 2002 economic crisis.  I will answer each of these briefly. 
Weisbrot claims that the increase in the percent of low birthweight babies is due to 
the decline in the percentage of children monitored for low birthweight.  Weisbrot does 
not present an argument why the change in the population sample would lead to an 
increase in the number of low birthweight babies.  Indeed, one might expect just the 
opposite – that as the prevalence of monitoring falls, low income areas are left out of the 
sample first, thus leading to a decline in measured number of low birthweight babies.  In 
any case, the claim that the reason for the increase in measured birthweight is that the 
Venezuelan state is no longer monitoring the weight of infants does not paint the most 
encouraging picture of the state of the country’s public health system. 
Regarding the rest of the series, I agree with the idea that there could be multiple 
factors that explain the deterioration in other indicators of the well-being of the poor, 
among them measurement error in the reported series.  But this is precisely the point: if 
Venezuela had seen a sea change in government policies, we would expect to see 
consistent improvements in all of these indicators.  But we instead find that the infant 
mortality rate has continued declining at the historical rate and that many indicators of the 
health and well-being of the poor have deteriorated.  Perhaps all of these indicators are so 
poorly measured that they can’t tell us anything about whether the poor are better off or 
not. But they are definitely not providing evidence that the lot of the Venezuelan poor has 
improved under Chávez. 
Regarding the 2002 recession, a close analysis of Venezuela’s fiscal and external 
accounts at the close of 2001 easily shows that the country was headed for a balance of 
payments and fiscal crisis even in the absence of a political crisis.  Despite a decline in 
the price of oil in 2002, the government had maintained a highly appreciated exchange 
rate, leading to a significant decline in external demand.  The appreciated exchange rate 
hurt Venezuelan competitiveness – the Bolívar appreciated in real terms by 55%  and 
137% with respect to the Colombian and Brazilian currencies – and also hurt the 
Venezuelan fiscal accounts, leading the country to run a fiscal deficit of 4.0% in 2004 
(and of 5.9% after discounting Central Bank distributions of forex gains).
12 The attack on 
                                                 
12 Moreno and Rodríguez, 2007, Figure 3, p.6.    14
the currency lasted through 2001, and by November the Central Bank had lost $5.4 
billion dollars in reserves trying to defend the currency, well before any political crisis 
had started.
13  In order to believe that this currency crisis was politically motivated, one 
would have to buy into an interpretation where a full year before there was even talk of a 
national strike the private sector started withdrawing its deposits from domestic banks in 
order to cause economic and political instability.  It is difficult to see why one would 
want to appeal to this fantastic conspiracy theory when there is clear evidence of 
deteriorating internal and external fundamentals leading up to the crisis. 
 
6.  Concluding Comments 
 
It is useful to recap some of our key arguments.  First, there is no evidence that the 
Chávez administration is devoting a higher share of resources to pro-poor spending.   
Second, inequality increased between 1999 and 2006, unless by inequality one means 
inequality among everyone except those who earn no income.  Third, the Venezuelan 
government did not teach 1.5 million persons how to read and write – at most the 
magnitude of the program was 1/30
th of what was claimed. Fourth, however one 
calculates it, Venezuela’s income elasticity of poverty reduction is below typical values 
for developing countries. Fifth, the majority of human development indicators do not 
show striking improvements under Chávez, and some show deteriorations.  
Weisbrot has not produced a convincing counterargument to any of these claims.  He 
has argued that social spending has increased by using series that are distorted by the 
inclusion of regressive pensions, large infrastructure projects, and even military spending.  
He has argued that inequality has declined on the basis of a series that excludes the 
poorest families from the sample. He has argued that the Venezuelan government put 
more than a million persons in literacy courses while presenting regression estimates that 
indicate that at most forty thousand persons were enrolled in these courses.  He has 
misinterpreted the concept of elasticity, and furthermore argued that the reason why 
government statistics do not show an improvement in the health of newborns is that the 
monitoring system has collapsed. To top this all off, he has presented an incredible 
conspiracy theory of the 2001 Venezuelan balance of payments crisis according to which 
the private sector withdrew funds from the domestic system during more than a year in 
order to provoke a political crisis. 
In closing, I would like to stress my conviction that an in-depth academic discussion 
is indispensable in order to evaluate and understand the nature of recent changes in 
Venezuela’s economy and society.  In any serious academic debate, there must be 
mechanisms that subject research to high standards of quality. One such mechanism is the 
peer review system, which ensures that research papers that do not pass basic standards 
of quality will not be published.  I would like to invite Mark Weisbrot to make use of that 
mechanism in the future, and wish him the best of luck. 
                                                 
13 Indeed, I discussed many of the causes of the looming recession in the article “¿Por qué se desacelera la 
enonomía venezolana?” (“Why is the Venezuelan economy decelerating?”) published in the Venezuelan 
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Appendix: Decomposition of PDVSA Expenditures 
Table A-1: Classification of PDVSA's "Social Development 
Expenditures" according to category of spending
2006 Expenditures 2001-6 Expenditures
Panel A: Breakdown of PDVSA Expenditures
Direct Expenditures
Health, Education, and Housing 2115 4829
Vuelvan Caras 234 626
Ribas 280 1003










Desarrollo Sustentable 63 63
Comunidades 677 875
Non-Social Spending 661 982
Nucleos de Desarrollo Endógeno 47 102
Proyecto Etanol 153
Obras Hidráulicas 27 27










Health, Education, and Housing 207 857
Vivienda 207 857





Health, Education, and Housing 882 1078
Other Social Spending 00
Non-Social Spending 5974 7303
Panel B: Breakdown of Main FONDEN Projects
Health, Education, and Housing 933 10.3%
Adquisición de Equipos Médicos y electromecánicos Barrio 
Adentro 3. Primer Bloque de Equipos. Primera Etapa 447 4.9%
Inicio de la primera fase de la Construcción de Viviendas y 14 0.2%
8.822 Viviendas para la culminación de Obras del Programa Cierre 
de Ciclo 104 1.2%
Construcción de nuevos desarrollos y compra de viviendas en el 92 1.0%
Indemnizaciones a Familias por Subsidencia en el Lago de 
Valencia 33 0.4%
Emergencia Vaguada 46 0.5%
Obras por ejecutar del INAVI para la construcción y culminación 102 1.1%
Barrio Adentro II 95 1.1%
Non-Social Spending 8101 89.7%
Linea III El Valle 274 3.0%
Linea IV  207 2.3%
Metro Maracaibo 102 1.1%
Metro Valencia 45 0.5%
Metro Los Teques 245 2.7%
Proyecto Ferroviario 12 0.1%
Sistema Vial 171 1.9%
Const Sistema Ferroviario 171 1.9%
Central Ezequiel Zamora Tramo: 476 5.3%
Autopista Acarigua - Barquisimeto 26 0.3%
Reh. del Sistema Centro Occidental "Simón Bolívar", 42 0.5%
Planta Termoeléctrica Termozulia 81 0.9%
Plantas Termoeléctricas Ezequiel Zamora y Alberto Lovera 14 0.2%
Consolidación de Redes de Distribución de los Edos. Monagas y 
Delta Amacuro 29 0.3%
Electrificación del Estado Apure 30 0.3%
Proyecto Ampliación Planta de Pequiven en Morón 162 1.8%
Sistema Vial Punte Mixto sobre Río Orinoco 273 3.0%
Central Hidroeléctrica Macagua I 63 0.7%
Capitalización Banco Agrícola de Venezuela 286 3.2%
Capitalización Fondo de Desarrollo Agropecuario, 327 3.6%
Culminación Fase I Proyecto saneamiento 13 0.1%
Iniciación de Proceso de Reestructuración de la Deuda Pública 3221 35.7%
VENESAT 10 0.1%
Proyectos Del Ministerio Para Del Poder Popular Para La Defensa 1093 12.1%
Of Ambiguous Classification 364 4.0%
120 Proyectos acordados en la IV Reunión de la Comisión Mixta 
del Convenio 364 4.0% 
Source: PDVSA (2006) and author’s calculations. 